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3PARTY TIME
The party conference season has not quelled Britain’s 
mounting crisis over Brexit. Rather the contrary. Each 
conference served to reinforce the party stereotype. 
Taking the political class as a collective, no onlooker 
could be left enriched by the talent on display. When 
in the final act Theresa May pranced on to the stage of 
the Conservative conference to ABBA’s Dancing Queen, 
an Economist journalist tweeted “British politics is an 
absolute freak show”. He was not wrong. 
What do the conferences tell us about the disposition 
of the House of Commons as it faces up to some crucial 
votes? The Liberal Democrats (12 MPs) want to overthrow 
the result of the 2016 ‘In/Out’ referendum whose holding 
they had themselves promoted. Vince Cable, Lib Dem 
leader, will oppose the Withdrawal Agreement he has 
not seen: instead, he promotes another referendum 
– a ‘people’s vote’ - to ‘exit from Brexit’. He wants an 
extension of the Article 50 process to allow for this. 
Caroline Lucas, the Greens’ sole MP, also takes this line.
The Scottish Nationalists (35 MPs) are less categorical. 
Nicola Sturgeon, SNP leader, warns against no deal but 
continues to sit on the fence about her parliamentary 
tactics and is wary about another referendum. The Welsh 
Nationalists (4 MPs) follow suit. 
The position of the Labour party (262 MPs) is a wonder to 
behold. After lengthy conference contortions to disguise 
deep splits in Labour ranks, their final position is to 
be against Mrs May’s deal, against no deal and against 
Remain. They might or might not support a second 
referendum. In a potentially significant move, however, 
Jeremy Corbyn admitted that if the government moved to 
stay in the EU customs union he might revise his blanket 
opposition to the deal. 
For their part, the Tories (317 MPs) made no attempt to 
hide their divisions, with Boris Johnson campaigning to 
‘chuck Chequers’ and oust its prime minister perpetrator. 
He even argues for an extension of Article 50 in order 
the better to plot. The Brexiteers oppose a second 
referendum because they might lose it. Theresa May also 
opposes another referendum - what she cleverly calls 
“a politicians’ vote” - on the grounds that the people 
have spoken once and commanded her government to 
deliver Brexit. She stubbornly refuses to rule out no deal, 
although she warned her conference that there is “no 
perfect Brexit”. She can say that again. 
The government is supported ostensibly by ten British 
nationalists (‘loyalists’) from Northern Ireland’s 
Democratic Unionist Party. But they are right-wing 
Brexiteers and cannot be entirely relied upon to back 
the Withdrawal Agreement in the long-expected 
‘meaningful vote1. 
What is clear after the conference season 
is that no parliamentary leader will be 
able to corral all his or her MPs to vote in 
one direction.
MEANINGFUL VOTE
To win Mrs May needs 320 votes.2 At this stage it is 
impossible to predict if she has them. What is clear after 
the conference season is that no parliamentary leader 
will be able to corral all his or her MPs to vote in one 
direction. Several MPs on both the Remain and Leave 
sides of the argument have said they will not follow their 
party whip; others may abstain from voting at all. 
Confusingly, while starkly opposing positions have been 
taken for and against the so-called ‘Chequers deal’, it is 
not that which will be brought before the Commons for 
a vote. What will be tabled is a compromise package deal 
reached between the EU and the UK government made up 
of two parts, the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political 
Declaration on the future relationship. 
The ‘meaningful vote’ will be take it or leave it. For 
both procedural and political reasons it is highly 
unlikely that the Commons will at that stage be 
able to qualify its approval or disapproval (except in 
abstracto by abstaining).3 The ‘people’s vote’ brigade 
will have a later, better chance to advance their cause 
by amending the EU Withdrawal Agreement Bill (WAB). 
But the government will only introduce the WAB if it 
has won the earlier ‘meaningful vote’. Furthermore, 
any amendment to WAB that has the blunt effect of 
obstructing Brexit is unlikely to be admissible under 
parliamentary rules. Even were the Commons (or the 
Lords) to vote successfully to insert a second referendum 
into the WAB process, parliament would then find it 
impossible, on the evidence of the party conferences, to 
agree on the question to be asked in the poll. 
A similar predicament would arise if the Article 50  
talks failed to reach a deal at all or if the deal reached were 
then to be rejected by the Commons in the meaningful 
vote. Although the government would have to make a 
statement to the House before the end of January, the 
prospect of MPs in disarray finding a consensus on an 
alternative prospectus is slim indeed. The government in 
those circumstances would almost certainly have to resign, 
and a chaotic general election would ensue. Consistent 
opinion polls suggest a dead heat between Labour and 
Conservatives, postulating a new House of Commons that 
could not sustain an effective government.
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The Union will not agree to extend the 
Article 50 deadline merely to indulge the 
second referendum campaigners or the 
anti-May plotters.
SHOWDOWN AT SALZBURG
The EU clock, meanwhile, continues to tick towards 
midnight on 29 March. The Union will not agree to 
extend the Article 50 deadline merely to indulge the 
second referendum campaigners or the anti-May plotters. 
Practical and legal considerations aside, the EU leaders 
are very sensitive to the charge that in extending Article 
50 they would be guilty of seeking to prevent the UK from 
leaving — the very opposite of the intention behind the 
drafting of Article 50. It would be helpful if EU leaders 
were to confirm their commitment to the scheduled 
timetable. It is a pity that they missed their opportunity 
to do so at their informal summit at Salzburg on 20 
September.4 They also failed to send a positive signal 
about the possibility of extending the transitional period. 
A common criticism of Theresa May is that she never 
listens properly to what she is being told. At Salzburg 
Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, took 
care to ensure that she heard from him why the integrity 
of the single market had to be protected. He repeated his 
blunt message to the press, and Mrs May flounced back to 
London to declare a crisis.
Mrs May needs to sharpen up her 
emotional intelligence and, at home 
and abroad, make the best possible 
case for moving forward on the basis of 
compromise in search for the less than 
perfect Brexit.
 
The element of crisis at Salzburg might have  
helped the Prime Minister through the Tory party  
conference, but it also provoked other cabinet  
ministers — notably Britain’s latest version of Foreign 
Secretary — into mounting fatuous, contemptible and 
wholly counterproductive attacks on the EU. Mr Tusk’s 
job is to ensure calm deliberation at the European 
Council meeting on 17-19 October. He remains 
unapologetic about Salzburg:
“Unacceptable remarks that raise the 
temperature will achieve nothing except wasting 
more time. What needs to be done is maximum 
progress by the October European Council. I was 
party leader myself, for fifteen years, and I know 
what the rules of party politics are. But now, 
once the Tory party conference is over, we should 
get down to business.”5
Mrs May needs to sharpen up her emotional intelligence 
and, at home and abroad, make the best possible case for 
moving forward on the basis of compromise in search for 
the less than perfect Brexit. 
MODIFYING THE CUSTOMS PROPOSALS
Which elements of Chequers and the subsequent White 
Paper need to be changed? First, the British must ditch 
their proposal for a Facilitated Customs Arrangement. 
It is unworkable, at least in its present form. There are 
legal and practical problems in delegating to the UK 
the EU’s customs control and tax collection, and the 
costs to business would be large. In its place, the UK has 
resurrected an earlier proposal – namely, that it remain in 
the EU’s customs union beyond the transitional period in 
order to ensure that business only has to adjust once to a 
new customs relationship. This temporary arrangement 
could be delivered through a customs union between 
the UK and the EU based on a shared external tariff and 
without customs processes and duties between the UK 
and the EU. The arrangement, and the guarantee of the 
Irish ‘backstop’, would remain in force until such time as 
a new, permanent customs cooperation agreement had 
entered into force. 
Formulae are being discussed to ensure 
that the overriding objective is the 
accomplishment of a final Association 
Agreement which guarantees a new 
balance of rights and obligations that 
encourages commerce while constraining 
British free-riding.
The EU wishes to ensure that the UK’s proposed 
temporary customs arrangement will not become a 
permanent fixture, allowing the British to enjoy the 
fruits of the internal market without respecting all its 
disciplines. Formulae are being discussed to ensure 
that the overriding objective is the accomplishment 
of a final Association Agreement which guarantees a 
new balance of rights and obligations that encourages 
commerce while constraining British free-riding. 
Safeguard clauses will be included to ensure that either 
the UK or the EU may take proportionate action to 
redress any imbalance arising.
THE IRISH QUESTION
Such an arrangement would help to resolve the difficulty 
over the Irish border. In her angry statement reacting to 
Salzburg (21 September), the Prime Minister seemed to 
5give the DUP an effective veto over any new regulatory 
and customs arrangements between the UK and the EU.
But Mrs May misinterprets the Good Friday Agreement, 
which gives oversight of customs matters to the 
intergovernmental North-South Ministerial Council (of 
which the Irish government is a member) and not to the 
Executive and Assembly at Stormont. Her error does 
not matter for the moment because neither Sinn Fein 
nor the DUP is brave enough to resurrect their attempt 
at power sharing in the devolved administration before 
Brexit Day on 29 March. The Irish government is rightly 
concerned, however, that London may collude with 
the DUP later in the Brexit saga when the long-term 
Association Agreement has to be agreed and ratified. 
Many at Westminster have never bothered to 
understand the constitutional nature of the pooling 
of sovereignty with the Irish Republic that the 1998 
Belfast Agreement determines. So they fail to see that 
the Irish peace process does not belong unilaterally 
to the UK, and neglect the fact that the EU itself is 
a guarantor of the process and will fight hard not to 
squander it. Last December’s Joint Report stipulated 
that no new regulatory barriers would be imposed on 
trade between Great Britain and Ireland unless they 
were consistent with the Good Friday Agreement. 
The EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier has been 
trying to de-dramatise the issue, suggesting ways to 
make customs controls on goods and agri-products 
flowing East to West across the Irish Sea effective but 
not obtrusive. As these regulatory checks are already 
routine, strengthening them would not seem to raise 
constitutional issues. 
In December 2017 Mrs May accepted in principle that 
the Irish backstop is a precondition of any Withdrawal 
Agreement. The backstop is the legal guarantee that if 
the UK and the EU fail to negotiate a new Association 
Agreement, the terms of the Good Friday Agreement 
will continue to be honoured. Mrs May accepted the 
Joint Report under some duress to progress to the 
next stage of the Article 50 talks she had triggered, 
but she immediately raised political objections to the 
implementation of the backstop in practice.
We have come now to the point where,  
to complete the Article 50 process,  
Mrs May must face down the DUP MPs  
at Westminster.
We have come now to the point where, to complete the 
Article 50 process, Mrs May must face down the DUP 
MPs at Westminster. Mr Barnier and Leo Varadkar, Irish 
Taoiseach, are working hard to be persuasive, but they 
have few votes in the Commons. The UK Parliament will 
finally have to accept that the collapse of Article 50 and 
a chaotic no deal would mean the re-erection of a hard 
and dangerous Ulster border which would not only ruin 
the fragile economy of Northern Ireland but could also 
pitch the island of Ireland into a forced reunification in 
the worst possible circumstances. 
If the EU is to be persuaded to accept the 
British proposal for a common rulebook 
for goods and agri-products, the UK will 
have to agree to widen the scope of those 
common rules to include social, consumer 
and environmental standards.
SERVICES AND MOBILITY
The UK is proposing to align voluntarily with some 
but not all of the EU acquis in order to gain access to 
the single market. The EU fears that the British are 
planning to undercut European social, technical and 
environmental standards and gain unfair competitive 
advantage. The combative tone of the Tory party 
conference has heightened those fears. Labour’s policy 
of wanting the benefits of the customs union without 
the burden of internal market rules, especially free 
movement of people, is less aggressive but scarcely more 
helpful. If the EU is to be persuaded to accept the British 
proposal for a common rulebook for goods and agri-
products, the UK will have to agree to widen the scope 
of those common rules to include social, consumer and 
environmental standards. 
London also needs to offer more on services. Since it 
is people who provide services, more freedom to carry 
services across the Channel, and a more liberal attitude 
on both sides to the establishment of service companies, 
would open the way to agreeing an ambitious ‘labour 
mobility framework’ (as Chequers describes it). This 
solution would be short of the freedom of movement 
of persons so integral to the EU’s single market, but it 
would ensure that EU citizens and their families could 
still expect employment and decent treatment in the 
UK. If it maintains its Brexit policy of planning to treat 
workers from the EU in the same way as it treats workers 
from the rest of the world, British citizens working in 
the EU can expect real difficulties. The application of 
restrictions on EU citizens moving to the UK will be met 
reciprocally by EU states, to the detriment of all. 
The inclusion in the Association Agreement of a clause 
similar to that in the European Economic Area treaty 
providing for emergency controls to stem immigration 
would be sufficient to justify the UK government’s claim 
that they had at last ‘controlled’ immigration.6 In any 
case, public opinion in Britain seems less alarmed about 
immigration today than it was in 2015-16 at the height 
of the Syrian crisis. Fewer EU citizens are attracted to 
working in Britain because the pound has lost 15% of its 
value since the referendum. And now British employers 
6are complaining about a growing skills shortage in many, 
if not all sectors of the economy: London commuters 
angry about the delay in the completion of Crossrail 
need look no further. The Conservative government’s 
new proposals to ration immigration by skills and 
salaries already look out of date.
Throughout the Article 50 talks there has 
been too little focus on governance – that 
is to say, how the Withdrawal Agreement 
and the future Association Agreement are 
to be run.
GOVERNANCE NEGLECTED
Throughout the Article 50 talks there has been too little 
focus on governance – that is to say, how the Withdrawal 
Agreement and the future Association Agreement are 
to be run. As a general rule, the British have never 
taken to the EU institutions: accusations of bossiness 
and intrusion are used by Brexiteers to vindicate their 
referendum victory. Jean-Claude Juncker and Michel 
Barnier are the butts of frequent insults in the London 
popular press. Against this background, it is hardly 
surprising that the EU negotiators do not trust the UK 
government. British protestations that the UK can be 
relied on to respect the EU acquis where relevant are 
wholly inadequate. 
It is true that the EU Withdrawal Act 2018 aims to retain 
EU law in the UK (as long as it is not altered unilaterally 
by Westminster), but EU law will be preserved without 
the primacy and direct effect that it enjoyed while 
the UK was still a member state. The proposed Joint 
Committee envisaged both for the transition period 
and as part of the future Association Agreement goes 
some way to mitigate EU fears. But British ministers are 
still reluctant to acknowledge, in private or in public, 
that future joint governance arrangements will mean 
respect for regulatory surveillance by the Commission 
and, ultimately, adherence to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice in matters of EU law. One can 
only lament the little progress made in preparing the EU 
and UK legal systems for their impending separation and 
their eventual resettlement in a new joint court structure.
 
Viewed from Brussels, the playing field 
across the Channel looks distinctly bumpy.
Nor has the UK made much progress in putting in place 
the new regulatory apparatus that will be required 
to be monitored and trusted, sector by sector, by the 
Commission and the Court of Auditors. Viewed from 
Brussels, the playing field across the Channel looks 
distinctly bumpy. Confidence building measures are 
badly needed. Here the transition period comes into 
play. It must be used not only for the negotiation of the 
new comprehensive Association Agreement but also 
to prepare the UK domestically to operate as an EU 
associated country. 
At present, and to the alarm of business, Whitehall is 
struggling to cope with the transformation of the British 
state that is required by its new status in Europe. It is not 
enough for companies to change their business models 
to adapt to the new situation. Government too must 
prepare new ways and means to ensure satisfactory and 
verifiable regulatory equivalence with the EU acquis for 
rules of origin, industrial processes, product standards 
and data protection. If the Commission is to be persuaded 
to out-source regulatory checks to British customs and 
excise officials, not least for Irish Sea traffic, it will require 
powers to investigate and verify conformity with single 
market norms.
We can be reasonably confident that 
the Withdrawal Agreement, which is a 
weighty and technical treaty, will succeed 
in extricating the EU and the UK from 
their mutual rights and obligations by  
29 March 2019.
CAN THE DEAL BE DONE?
The scramble is on to reach agreement on all outstanding 
issues in time for next week’s European Council with a 
probable special summit across the weekend of 17-18 
November. The deal will not be perfect. There will be 
trade-offs. There can be ambiguity. Nevertheless, we can 
be reasonably confident that the Withdrawal Agreement, 
which is a weighty and technical treaty, will succeed in 
extricating the EU and the UK from their mutual rights 
and obligations by 29 March 2019. It will seal the deal 
on the Irish backstop. It will provide for an extendable 
transition period.7 
More interesting is the accompanying Political 
Declaration on the future relationship. There is an 
important debate to be had about the legal status of this 
document. I have made the point previously that it is 
wrong to dismiss it as ‘non-binding’. But what is vital 
in the next few days is that the Political Declaration 
paints a clear and positive picture of a future dynamic 
Association Agreement. Merely trotting out EU legal 
orthodoxy will be sterile. Repetition of the EU’s cardinal 
principles for the negotiation of free trade agreements 
will be inadequate.
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No partnership works well if it is static. 
While divergence is the order of the day 
today, it might not be so for ever.
No partnership works well if it is static. While 
divergence is the order of the day today, it might not 
be so for ever. New challenges, for instance in the 
digital economy or energy field, will require renewed 
conversation between London and Brussels. The 
European Union itself, especially shorn of British 
inhibitions, may take critical constitutional steps in 
the federal direction that will prompt a reconfiguration 
1 Parliament has ensured that the government will not be able to ratify the 
Withdrawal Agreement until Parliament has passed a motion to approve it, 
along with the Political Declaration on the long-term UK-EU relationship 
(section 13 of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018). It has also insisted that primary 
legislation is needed to implement the Withdrawal Agreement.
2 The House has 650 members, but the Speaker and his three deputies do not 
vote (except to break a tie) and the 7 MPs from Sinn Fein do not take their 
seats. Sylvia Hermon is a moderate Independent MP from Northern Ireland 
who will probably incline to support the Withdrawal Agreement. 
3 See The Brexit Endgame: a guide to the parliamentary process of withdrawal 
from the EU, The UK in a Changing Europe, 29 September 2018. 
4 For analysis of the Chequers agreement and the White Paper, see my previous 
paper Brexit: Beyond the transition, EPC Discussion Paper, 21 August 2018. 
5 Press conference after a meeting with Leo Varadkar, 4 October. 
6 Article 112 of the EEA Treaty. See Jean-Claude Piris, Why the UK will not 
become a member of the EEA after Brexit, E!Sharp, September 2018. 
7 See Tobias Lock and Fabian Zuleeg, Extending the transition period, EPC 
Discussion Paper, 28 September 2018. 
8 The constitutional debate has already opened up with an eye on next year’s 
elections to the European Parliament and Commission. See especially http://
www.spinelligroup.eu/2018manifesto and http://bruegel.org/2018/09/one-
size-does-not-fit-all/ 
of its neighbourhood policy.8 Security threats from 
Russia, not least, and instability in the transatlantic 
relationship are problems shared by the UK and the  
EU: joint undertakings, impossible today in the 
context of Brexit, might very well become obvious and 
practicable tomorrow. 
The Political Declaration is a memorandum of 
understanding about a deep and special partnership. 
It can be an attractive document, helping to dispel 
the gloom and despondency which has fallen on this 
Brexit business. It should guide the EU member states 
and its institutions into agreeing on a mandate for the 
negotiation of the Association Agreement. It might 
secure at Westminster the beginning of a bipartisan 
consensus about Britain’s future as a European country. 
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